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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
On January 29, 1997, Louis Parise Jr. and his father, 
Louis Parise Sr., were convicted of various crimes arising 
out of their involvement with the National Maritime Union 
("NMU"). Parise Jr.'s RICO conviction under 18 U.S.C. 
S 1962(c) was predicated on his violation of the 
Pennsylvania commercial bribery statute, 18 Pa. C.S.A. 
S 4108(c). Specifically, Parise Jr. was found to have 
delivered cash bribes to two "port agents" in exchange for 
their referral of union members with personal injury cases 
to Parise Jr.'s employer, the Sacks law firm. 
 
On appeal Parise Jr. argues that there was insufficient 
evidence to support his RICO conviction. He also contends 
that his actions did not constitute commercial bribery 
under Pennsylvania law. We disagree with his view as to 
how the law should be applied to the facts of this case, and 
find that the evidence was sufficient to support his 
conviction. Parise Jr. also challenges the district court's 
exclusion of certain testimony relating to the commercial 
bribery charge. We find this argument to be similarly 
unavailing. We will thus affirm the order of the district 
court. 
 
I. 
 
The convictions at issue in this case arose out of an 
extensive government investigation of corruption within the 
NMU and several related organizations. The NMU 
represents merchant marine seafarers who work on 
commercial shipping vessels. One of the improprieties 
revealed through the government's investigation was a 
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bribery scheme devised and implemented by Louis Parise 
Sr., the President of the NMU, his son, Louis Parise Jr., and 
attorneys Avrem Adler and Bernard Sacks.1  Through this 
plan, developed in 1988, port agents and other union 
employees provided Sacks with personal injury case 
referrals in exchange for cash payments.2  As part of the 
scheme, Parise Jr. was hired as an "investigator" for the 
Sacks law firm and was responsible for delivering the bribes 
to the port agents. Parise Sr. promised these legal referrals 
to Sacks in exchange for a kickback of 5% of the legal fees 
generated through NMU cases. In 1992, a Legal Services 
Plan ("LSP") was created through which attorneys were to 
provide low or no cost legal services to union members. It 
was hoped that these members would then be more likely 
to retain designated attorneys, including Sacks, for their 
more lucrative cases. Parise Jr. was named as "co- 
administrator" of the LSP. 
 
Sacks cooperated with the government investigation and 
during the trial testified at length about the bribery 
scheme. Sacks explained that Parise Jr.'s role was to pay 
port agents in particular cities a set fee for referral of 
personal injury cases to the Sacks firm. Several port 
agents, including Floyd Jones, John Pegan, and Debra  
Rywelski,3 testified about the money paid to them by Parise 
Jr. for these case referrals. Other witnesses provided 
additional evidence relating to Parise Jr.'s role in the NMU 
and in carrying out the bribery scheme. After a three week 
trial, the jury found Parise Jr. guilty of the RICO violation, 
of Travel Act violations and of RICO forfeiture. The RICO 
conviction was based on the jury's finding that Parise Jr. 
had bribed Pegan and Rywelski in violation of 
Pennsylvania's commercial bribery statute. The district 
court denied Parise Jr.'s post-trial motion for acquittal or a 
new trial, and Parise Jr. appeals the judgment of conviction 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Adler died before this case was brought to trial. 
 
2. Between 1988-93 Sacks earned over $1.4 million in legal fees from 
these NMU personal injury cases. 
 
3. Rywelski was a NMU employee, but was not officially a "port agent." 
She served as a Pension and Welfare Plan Representative who helped 
union members with their benefits. 
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entered on September 11, 1997. This court has jurisdiction 
to review the final judgment of the district court pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
The jury verdict in this case "must be sustained if there 
is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to 
the Government, to support it." Glasser v. United States, 
315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). See United States v. Aguilar, 843 
F.2d 155, 157 (3d Cir. 1988). To the extent that Parise Jr.'s 
arguments raise issues of statutory interpretation, our 
review is plenary. See United States v. Hayden, 64 F.3d 
126, 128 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
II. 
 
A. RICO violation 
 
Parise Jr. offers two related challenges to the sufficiency 
of the evidence which sustained his conviction under RICO. 
First, Parise Jr. argues that the government failed to 
adequately connect him with the indicted "enterprise" 
because several of the racketeering acts charged in the 
indictment were committed prior to the existence of the 
Legal Services Plan, and even those acts which occurred 
after the formation of the LSP were not directly linked with 
his role in the LSP. Secondly, Parise Jr. contends that the 
government failed to demonstrate that he participated in 
directing the affairs of the enterprise as required to sustain 
a RICO conviction. In addition, Parise Jr. challenges the 
district court's jury instruction relating to the requisite 
showing that must be made to establish "association" 
under RICO. 
 
1. Connection with an "enterprise" 
 
The RICO statute provides that "it shall be unlawful for 
any person employed by or associated with any enterprise 
engaged in . . . interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct 
or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such 
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering 
activity or collection of unlawful debt." 18 U.S.C. S 1962(c). 
A conviction under this statute requires that the 
government prove the following four elements: 
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       (1) the existence of an enterprise affecting inter state 
       commerce; (2) that the defendant was employed by o r 
       associated with the enterprise; (3) that the defen dant 
       participated, either directly or indirectly, in the conduct 
       or the affairs of the enterprise; and (4) that he or she 
       participated through a pattern of racketeering activity. 
 
United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 652-53 (3d Cir. 
1993) (citation omitted). 
 
The statute defines an enterprise as "any individual, 
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, 
and any union or group of individuals associated in fact 
although not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C. S 1961(4). The 
indictment in this case charged that four legal entities 
made up the RICO enterprise: (1) the National Mari time 
Union ("NMU"); the NMU Pension and Welfare Plan; (3) the 
Committee for the Administration of the NMU; and (4)  the 
Legal Services Plan ("LSP"). 
 
Parise Jr. contends that because the government alleged 
in the indictment that the enterprise -- which we will call 
the "NMU Enterprise" -- was comprised of four 
organizations, no "enterprise" could have existed prior to 
September 1992, when the fourth organization, the LSP, 
was created. Therefore, Parise Jr. asserts, alleged illegal 
activity which took place before September 1992 cannot 
properly serve as the basis for his RICO liability. 4 
 
Parise Jr.'s argument fails to appreciate the nature of an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The indictment characterized Parise Jr.'s role as follows: 
 
       From in or about late 1988 to the present . . . Louis Parise, Jr. 
and 
       others known and unknown to the grand jury, being persons 
       employed by and associated with the enterprise . . . knowingly, 
       unlawfully, and willfully conducted and participated, directly and 
       indirectly, in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise . . . . 
 
       Defendant Louis Parise, Jr., used his position as an investigator 
for 
       attorney Sacks and as a co-administrator of the ITPE-NMU Legal 
       Benefits Plan, to promote and aid and abet commercial bribery by 
       traveling in interstate commerce, and using interstate facilities, 
to 
       deliver cash payments and things of value to union officials who 
       referred injured union members to attorney Sacks as their lawyer 
       . . . . 
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"enterprise" as defined by the RICO statute. The four 
organizations were included in the indictment because all 
were channels through which illegal activity was taking 
place and through which the NMU Enterprise operated. 
This does not mean, however, that no illegal activity of the 
enterprise could occur prior to the existence or entry of one 
of the indicted entities. In order to establish the existence 
of an "enterprise" for the purposes of RICO, the government 
must demonstrate that there is "an ongoing organization" 
whose "various associates function as a continuing unit." 
See United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214, 221 (3d Cir. 
1983) (citing United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 
(1981)). However, "continuity does not require that each 
member of the enterprise participate in it from beginning to 
end." United States v. Feldman, 853 F.2d 648, 659 (9th Cir. 
1988); see United States v. Hewes, 729 F.2d 1302, 1310-11 
(11th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the argument that government 
must prove participation of all members throughout the life 
of the enterprise). Rather, the government must 
demonstrate that all alleged members who participated at 
one time or another were part of an ongoing enterprise with 
a shared "organizational pattern" and "system of authority." 
United States v. Lemm, 680 F.2d 1193, 1199 (8th Cir. 
1982). 
 
The evidence adduced at trial demonstrated that the 
NMU Enterprise existed prior to September 1992 and that 
upon its formation, the LSP became part of the ongoing 
enterprise which satisfied the organizational and structural 
requirements of Riccobene. 709 F.2d at 221. The LSP was 
developed as another method of generating personal injury 
cases; the pursuit of these cases was already an activity of 
the NMU Enterprise. The major participants in the 
enterprise remained essentially the same from 1988 on, 
demonstrating the continuity of the enterprise. The 
testimony showed that during this period Louis Parise Sr. 
was the "system of authority" which united all of the 
organizations which formed the NMU Enterprise: the elder 
Parise had relatively unfettered discretion to direct both the 
legal and illegal activities of the union and its related 
organizations. Because the NMU Enterprise existed before 
the formation of the LSP, Parise Jr.'s actions prior to 1992 
could properly form the basis for his RICO conviction. 
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Parise Jr. next asserts that all of the racketeering charges 
-- even those relating to post-1992 activity -- are deficient 
because the government failed to connect any of his alleged 
acts of bribery with his position as co-administrator of the 
LSP. Parise Jr. contends that his actions taken while he 
was an investigator for the Sacks law firm cannot form the 
basis for his RICO conviction because the law firm was not 
named as one of the organizations which formed the 
"enterprise." However, this argument misconstrues the 
government's burden. At trial, the government needed to 
demonstrate that Parise Jr. participated, directly or 
indirectly, in the conduct of the NMU Enterprise's affairs 
through a pattern of racketeering activity. In so doing, 
however, the government was not limited to demonstrating 
that Parise Jr.'s participation in the affairs of the enterprise 
flowed from his official role within the LSP. In fact, from the 
evidence adduced at trial it is clear that Parise Jr.'s 
eventual position with the LSP was not necessary to 
establish that he associated with or participated in the 
affairs of the NMU Enterprise. Rather, as is discussed 
below, we agree with Parise Jr. that his actions as co- 
administrator of the LSP were merely a continuation of his 
previously established pattern of racketeering activities. 
 
Parise Jr. also appears to be arguing that he could only 
have been found to have "associated with" the organization 
in which he held a formal position, but the language of the 
RICO statute leaves no room for this contention. The law 
explicitly states that a RICO defendant must be employed 
by or associated with an enterprise. 18 U.S.C. S 1962(c). For 
the purposes of RICO, the threshold showing of 
"association" is not difficult to establish: it is satisfied by 
proof that the defendant was "aware of at least the general 
existence of the enterprise named in the indictment." United 
States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 577 n.29 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(quoting United States v. Castellano, 610 F. Supp. 1359, 
1401-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)); see also Console, 13 F.3d at 653. 
That is, a defendant must be aware of the general nature of 
the enterprise and know that the enterprise extends beyond 
his individual role. See United States v. Rastelli, 870 F.2d 
822, 828 (2d Cir. 1989). Here, the necessary showing of 
"association" was easily met. The evidence showed that 
Parise Jr. attended the initial meeting during which the 
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bribery scheme was discussed -- this fact alone is sufficient 
to demonstrate that he was aware of the NMU Enterprise 
and knew that the activities of the NMU Enterprise 
extended beyond his role in bribing union employees. 
 
2. Participation in the conduct of the affairs of the 
   enterprise 
 
We now turn our attention to the third element essential 
to a RICO conviction -- namely, whether the government's 
evidence demonstrated that Parise Jr. participated in the 
conduct of the affairs of the enterprise. Our analysis of this 
claim must begin with an examination of the definition of 
"participation" under S 1962(c) as clarified by the Supreme 
Court in Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993). In 
Reves, the Court endorsed the "operation or management" 
test to determine whether a defendant participated in the 
conduct of an enterprise's affairs. Id. at 184. According to 
Reves, "[i]n order to `participate, directly or indirectly, in the 
conduct of such enterprise's affairs,' one must have some 
part in directing those affairs." Id. at 179. However, one 
need not hold a formal position within an enterprise in 
order to "participate" in its affairs. Id. at 179. Further, the 
"operation or management" test does not limit RICO liability 
to upper management because "an enterprise is`operated' 
not just by upper management but also by lower-rung 
participants in the enterprise who are under the direction 
of upper management." Id. at 184. In so holding, the Court 
made clear that RICO liability may extend to those who do 
not hold a managerial position within an enterprise, but 
who do nonetheless knowingly further the illegal aims of 
the enterprise by carrying out the directives of those in 
control. 
 
In applying Reves, we have stated that the"operation or 
management" test is designed to limit RICO liability under 
S 1962(c) to those situations in which the government can 
demonstrate "a nexus between the person and the conduct 
in the affairs of an enterprise." University of Maryland at 
Baltimore v. Peat, Marwick, Main & Co., 996 F.2d 1534, 
1539 (3d Cir. 1993).5 The First Circuit has stated that RICO 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Although Reves was a civil RICO case, the "operation or management" 
test is applicable to criminal RICO cases as well. See, e.g., United 
States 
v. Antar, 53 F.3d 568, 580-81 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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liability extends to those "plainly integral to carrying out" 
the enterprise's activities. See United States v. Shifman, 124 
F.3d 31, 36 (1st Cir. 1997) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 
118 S. Ct. 1053 (1998). 
 
It is clear that Parise Jr. participated in the conduct of 
the affairs of the NMU Enterprise for several years before he 
was given the formal title of "co-administrator" of the LSP. 
In his role as investigator for the Sacks law firm, Parise Jr. 
was integral to the enterprise's plan to funnel personal 
injury cases to Sacks in order to reap a percentage of the 
money generated. Parise Jr. traveled to port cities paying off 
the union agents and informing them that Sacks was the 
official NMU attorney for the East Coast. Thus, even before 
he had a formal role within the LSP, Parise Jr. was deeply 
involved in -- and integral to -- the operation of the NMU 
Enterprise. The government produced evidence that Parise 
Jr. was acting at the direction of his father, the union 
President -- clearly upper level management -- to carry out 
the illegal activities of the NMU Enterprise. As a result of 
Parise Jr.'s work, his father, the head of the enterprise, 
received substantial kickbacks from Sacks. 
 
In 1992, in furtherance of the scheme and reflective of 
his important role in the enterprise, Parise Jr. became co- 
administrator of the LSP. Through this official position, he 
maintained and expanded his role in operating the NMU 
Enterprise. In addition to continuing the payoff 
arrangement with port agents, he also coordinated the 
effort of the LSP to select local attorneys to do the routine 
legal work for union members -- and to channel more 
lucrative cases to attorneys selected by Parise Sr. 
 
Reves focused on the RICO liability of those "outside" an 
enterprise who may assist in furthering the illegal activities 
of the enterprise. 507 U.S. at 183-85. The Court did not 
reach the issue of the liability of those "inside," specifically 
declining to determine "how far S 1962(c) extends down the 
ladder of operation." Id. at 184 n.9. However, we need not 
dwell on this issue because Parise Jr.'s substantial 
involvement in the criminal activities of the NMU Enterprise 
does not present a close case. We are not concerned with 
improperly extending RICO liability to a low-level employee 
who was unaware of the criminal activities of the larger 
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enterprise. See United States v. Viola, 35 F.3d 37, 43 (2d 
Cir. 1994) (reversing conviction of defendant who did light 
clean-up and maintenance work on the ground that the 
government had failed to show that he exercised any 
"discretionary authority" or that he "was even aware of the 
broader enterprise"). Sacks testified that Parise Jr. was 
present during the original meeting where the bribery plan 
was discussed. The fact that he continued to play an 
essential role in implementing the scheme was well 
documented during the trial. Parise Jr. does not contend on 
appeal that he was an unwitting -- or unwilling-- actor. 
 
From the extensive evidence presented at trial, the jury 
could easily conclude that the government established a 
nexus between Parise Jr. and the affairs of the NMU 
Enterprise. Parise Jr. played a role in directing the affairs 
of the NMU Enterprise as required by Reves and could be 
found criminally liable under RICO. 
 
3. Challenge to the jury instruction 
 
Parise Jr. next challenges -- as he did at trial-- the 
district court's jury instructions in which the district court 
advised the jury that "the Government has alleged that 
defendant Louis Parise Jr. was associated with the 
enterprise through his dealing[s] with various NMU officials 
you have heard testify."6 Parise Jr. contends that this 
statement led the jury to believe that it couldfind proof of 
the requisite association by virtue of the alleged bribery of 
port agents Jones, Pegan, and Rywelski even if there was 
no other proof that Parise Jr. had associated with the NMU 
Enterprise. However, giving the term "dealings" its plain 
meaning, we interpret it to mean all interactions or 
contacts between the union officials and Parise Jr. during 
which they had the opportunity to learn about his role in 
the NMU Enterprise. There is no basis either in the context 
of the instruction or the evidence of the case to equate the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. This instruction will be reviewed to determine if, taken as a whole and 
in the light of the evidence, it fairly and adequately submitted the issue 
to the jury. See United States v. Traitz, 871 F.2d 368, 385 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(citation omitted). No error will be found if the district court correctly 
communicated the substance of the law to the jury so that the jury was 
not misled as to the relevant law or issues. Id. 
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word "dealings" with payoffs or bribes. The substance of the 
testimony of NMU employees such as Pegan and Rywelski 
was not limited to their discussion of payoffs for legal 
referrals, but also included testimony in which they 
described Parise Jr.'s overall involvement with the NMU 
Enterprise. Furthermore this jury instruction referred to 
"various NMU officials" who testified, including James 
Overstreet, a business agent for the NMU, and Kenneth 
Gerasimos, a former Vice President of the union. Both of 
these officials testified that Parise Jr. was present at union 
meetings and events. The entire testimony of the officials as 
to "dealings" with NMU officials formed the evidentiary 
basis for a jury determination that Parise Jr. was 
"associated with" the enterprise. 
 
Finally, it is important that the challenged portion of the 
charge be read in the context of the entire set of 
instructions. The district court did instruct the jury as to 
the need for proof of Parise Jr.'s involvement with the 
enterprise and its affairs as such: 
 
       [T]he Government must establish that each defendant 
       was able to commit the racketeering offense solely by 
       virtue of his position in the enterprise or his 
       involvement in or participation in or control over the 
       affairs of the enterprise. The Government must also 
       establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged 
       racketeering acts were committed in the conduct of the 
       affairs of the enterprise. 
 
The court's instructions made clear that conduct relating to 
the NMU Enterprise must form the basis for RICO liability. 
Therefore, we find that the district court's instructions 
correctly conveyed the substance of the law and fairly and 
adequately submitted this issue to the jury. 
 
B. Predicate Acts of Commercial Bribery 
 
In order to prove a RICO violation, the government must 
demonstrate that the defendant participated in the 
operation of an enterprise "through a pattern of 
racketeering activity . . ." 18 U.S.C. S 1962(c).7 A pattern is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. "Racketeering activity" is defined, in pertinent part, as "any act or 
threat involving murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, 
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established by proving that the defendant committed two or 
more illegal acts of the type associated with organized 
crime. See Riccobene, 709 F.2d at 226-27. The indictment 
alleged that Parise Jr. had violated Pennsylvania's law 
against commercial bribery by paying port agents to refer 
personal injury cases to Sacks. The testimony elicited at 
trial established that port agents were favoring Sacks in 
exchange for payoffs from Parise Jr. The jury found that 
Parise Jr. had bribed two union employees, Pegan and 
Rywelski. Pennsylvania's statute defines commercial bribery 
as follows: 
 
       An employee, agent or fiduciary commits a 
       misdemeanor of the second degree when, without the 
       consent of his employer or principal, he solicits, 
       accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit from another 
       person upon agreement or understanding that such 
       benefit will influence his conduct in relation to the 
       affairs of his employer or principal. 
 
18 Pa. C.S.A. S 4108(a). Under the following provision, the 
statute also criminalizes solicitation of bribes:"[a] person 
commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he confers, 
or offers or agrees to confer, any benefit the acceptance of 
which would be criminal under subsections (a) or (b) or this 
section." 18 Pa. C.S.A. S 4108(c). Thus, by conferring the 
benefit on the union port agents, Parise Jr. could be found 
guilty of commercial bribery. 
 
Parise Jr. argues that giving money to a union agent or 
employee for the referral of personal injury cases does not 
constitute "conduct in relation to the affairs of" the union 
as required to establish commercial bribery under 
Pennsylvania law. Parise Jr. is essentially contending that 
because referring seamen to lawyers is not included among 
a port agent's official duties, it cannot constitute "conduct 
in relation to the affairs of" the employer. He asserts that 
the union -- the employer in this case -- has no interest or 
stake in which lawyer an injured worker chooses, and that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in a controlled substance 
or listed chemical . . . which is chargeable under State law and 
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year." 18 U.S.C. 
S 1961(1)(A). 
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providing legal referrals is not within the scope of the port 
agents' employment. The government argues that Parise 
Jr.'s reading of the statute, especially in light of the facts of 
this case, is too constricted. It urges that the "affairs in 
relation to" language of the statute encompasses 
employment-related activity beyond that which is part of an 
employee's official duties. 
 
As the present case arises under this court's federal 
question jurisdiction, we will address all of the issues 
necessary to our ruling, including questions involving the 
interpretation of state law. See United States v. D'Amato, 
436 F.2d 52, 54 (3d Cir. 1970). In interpreting the text of 
18 Pa. C.S.A. S 4108, we are mindful that the Constitution 
requires that criminal laws be strictly construed. Due 
process mandates that criminal statutes give "fair warning 
. . . to the world in language that the common world will 
understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line 
is passed." McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 
(1931); see also United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 
(1997). In addition, Pennsylvania's laws regarding statutory 
construction dictate that penal provision are to be strictly 
interpreted. 1 Pa. C.S.A. S 1928(b)(1). However, the 
Pennsylvania courts have also held that "strict construction 
does not require that the words of a criminal statute be 
given their narrowest meaning or that the legislature's 
evident intent be disregarded." Commonwealth v. Gordon, 
515 A.2d 558, 561 (Pa. 1986). Furthermore, we must also 
refrain from reading additional provisions into a statute 
when its meaning is clear. See In re J.S., 586 A.2d 909, 913 
(Pa. 1991). Against this backdrop, we turn our attention to 
the meaning of the statute and the evidence offered to prove 
that the port agents' receipt of money influencing their 
conduct was "in relation to the affairs" of their employer, 
the union. 
 
a. Requirements for Commercial Bribery under the 
   Pennsylvania Statute 
 
At the outset, it must be noted that the language of the 
Pennsylvania commercial bribery statute makes its reach 
quite broad. It requires that an employee solicit or accept a 
benefit from another in order to influence the employee's 
conduct in relation to his employer's affairs. The statute 
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contains no requirement that the affected conduct be in 
relation to the official duties of an agent or employee, nor 
does it require a showing that an offender's conduct was 
adverse to the interests of the employer. In construing the 
language of the commercial bribery statute and in 
determining the meaning of "conduct in relation to the 
affairs" of an employer, we turn to the case of 
Commonwealth v. Bellis, 399 A.2d 397 (Pa. 1979), for 
direction. 
 
In Bellis -- the only Pennsylvania Supreme Court case 
which discusses this issue directly -- the court affirmed the 
judgment of sentence of a city councilman convicted of 
commercial bribery.8 Bellis, 399 A.2d at 400. Councilman 
Bellis had represented private parties before city agencies 
in order to help these companies secure contracts with 
these agencies. The companies rewarded his efforts 
accordingly. Among other contentions, Bellis argued to the 
court that he was not guilty of commercial bribery because 
the conduct at issue did not interfere with his official duties 
as a councilman. His conduct involved contracts between 
third parties and other city agencies and departments, 
quite apart from any matter before city council or otherwise 
affecting his role or responsibilities as a councilman. The 
Bellis court found that it was uncontested that the 
defendant's acceptance of these bribes "did not affect the 
performance of his official duties as a city councilman" and 
that "he did not take any action in City Council on behalf 
of private parties." Id. at 398. The court stated, however, 
that whether a particular activity was among an employee's 
"official duties" was "irrelevant" to the commercial bribery 
inquiry. Id. at 400. Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
has rejected the argument that the bribe must impact one's 
official duties in order to comprise "conduct in relation to 
the affairs of his employer or principal." 
 
The Bellis court recognized that commercial bribery was 
criminalized on the theoretical premise that such acts 
represent a violation of the duty of loyalty that an employee 
owes to an employer. The court stated that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Bellis was convicted under 18 Pa. C.S.A. S 4667, the predecessor of 18 
Pa. C.S.A. S 4108. 
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       [t]he purpose of Section 4667 is to require an"agent, 
       employe or servant" to possess an undivided loyalty to 
       his principal. It is impossible for an agent to retain this 
       loyalty as long as he solicits and/or receives money 
       from third parties in return for acting on their behalf 
       (i.e., "showing . . . favor or disfavor") in his principal's 
       affairs. By representing private parties before city 
       officials while he was a councilman, appellant showed 
       "favor or disfavor" in the affairs of his principal (the 
       City of Philadelphia) in that he negotiated on behalf of 
       and in the best interests of private parties in their 
       dealings with the city. Hence, appellant violated 
       Section 4667. 
 
Bellis, 399 A.2d at 400. Thus, the court determined that a 
violation of the employee's duty automatically occurs when 
an agent or employee offers or receives money which causes 
him to act in a certain way -- namely as the payor wishes 
-- in the conduct of the affairs of his employer. The court 
viewed the violation as being implicit in the conduct. The 
act of accepting a benefit to show favor is the gravamen of 
the crime. 
 
The above-quoted language in Bellis makes it disloyal, 
and criminal, for an employee to accept money to show 
favor to third parties in his principal's affairs. We view this 
reasoning as undermining the position taken by our 
dissenting colleague that being influenced for money in 
one's job is criminal only if found to be against the interests 
of the employer. Neither the Pennsylvania legislature, nor 
its courts, have inserted such a requirement into the 
offense of commercial bribery. The Bellis court did not 
examine the contracts in question to determine whether 
they were good for the City. Nor do we believe that such an 
inquiry is appropriate under the plain meaning of the 
statute. The Bellis court made clear that the showing of 
favor or disfavor on the basis of money paid is the harm 
addressed by the commercial bribery statute. The court 
need not make a determination as to whether the choice of 
a particular vendor influenced by a monetary payment was 
detrimental to the employer. In U.S. v. Johns, 742 F. Supp. 
196, 220 (E.D. Pa. 1990), the court found the defendant 
guilty of commercial bribery under S 4108 even though the 
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parties had stipulated that the price and quality of the 
products obtained from the favored vendor were "more 
favorable" than any offered by competitors. While it is true 
that other states have included this requirement as a 
statutory element or interpreted it to be a requirement, 
those cases are not our guide.9 Courts should not legislate 
by reading into the laws provisions not included by the 
legislature.10 This principle was recently reiterated by this 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. At least one state includes the words "contrary to the interests of the 
employer" within its statute. See Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-508 (1953). 
Another requires that the "conduct of the employee cause[ ] economic 
loss to the employer." See Ariz. Rev. Stat. S 13-2605. Pennsylvania's 
statute contains no such limiting language. It is true that "[i]t appears 
that in New York, actions which might otherwise contravene Penal S 439 
[commercial bribery statute] are not criminal if they do not affect the 
employer's interest in any way." D.E. Ytreberg, Annotation, Validity and 
Construction of Statutes Punishing Commercial Bribery, 1 A.L.R.3d 1350, 
1361 (1965) (citing People v. Jacobs, 130 N.E.2d 636, 637 (N.Y. 1955) 
and People v. Graf, 24 N.Y.S.2d 683 (App. Div. 1941)). However, we 
believe that the dissent has misinterpreted this excerpt as stating a 
requirement which has been read into the statute by all states. As we 
discuss, we find the reasoning of these cases to be inconsistent with the 
Pennsylvania courts' interpretation of this state's commercial bribery 
statute. The dissent also cites Jackson v. Radcliffe, 795 F. Supp. 197, 
206 (S.D. Tex. 1992) in support of the proposition that payments in 
exchange for referrals will only constitute commercial bribery where an 
employee has put the interests of the payor above the contrary interest 
of the employer. In that case, the court found that the kickbacks at issue 
simply did not constitute a bribe or benefit as required by the statute. 
Thus, the court never reached the issue of whether the employer was 
adversely impacted by the scheme. 
 
10. The dissent cites State v. Nadeau, 105 A.2d 194 (R.I. 1954) for the 
proposition that it is not commercial bribery to induce an agent to accept 
a payment in an attempt to influence conduct over which the agent had 
no control. We note first that Nadeau had been convicted under Rhode 
Island's statute prohibiting bribery of a public official, not under that 
state's commercial bribery statute. Nadeau is thus inapposite because its 
language regarding "official acts" seems clearly limited to the context in 
which that appeal was brought, namely, a government official accused of 
taking bribes in connection with his duties as an official. Further, to 
the 
extent that the holding of Nadeau can be applied to commercial bribery, 
we do not find it to be consistent with Pennsylvania precedent. The court 
in Bellis did not concern itself with whether Councilman Bellis could 
actually control or influence the contracting practices of the various 
city 
agencies involved. Again, the imposition of elements not present in the 
statute is not warranted. 
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court in Brokerage Concepts, Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 
140 F.3d 494, 527-28 (3d Cir. 1998). There, interpreting a 
different section of Pennsylvania's commercial bribery 
statute, we rejected an attempt by one of the parties to 
insert an additional element -- that of the defendant's 
motivation -- into the statute. Id. We noted that the crime 
of commercial bribery is "carefully circumscribed," 
consistent with our view that elements which do not appear 
in the statutory language should not be read into the law.11 
 
In order to find the payment of money influenced the 
employee's conduct in relation to the employer's affairs, we 
must define the scope of the union's affairs. In so doing, we 
will consider not only the mission and activities of the 
union but whether the conduct in question was consistent 
with the scope of the union agents' employment. Thus, in 
this case, we must determine if the port agents were 
performing their jobs in advising the seamen as to counsel 
for work-related injuries and whether this practice of 
referral was a concern of the union and part of its affairs. 
Appellants do not seek to define "affairs" but contend that 
whatever it means, the referral to counsel was not part of 
the affairs of the union. We believe the evidence supports 
the opposite conclusion. 
 
b. The Union's Affairs 
 
The purpose of the NMU, as set forth in its constitution, 
is described as helping "needy, sick and distressed" 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Having determined that the government was not obligated to prove as 
a separate element of the commercial bribery offense that the agent was 
acting against the interest of the employer, we need not reach the issue 
raised by the dissent that the conduct in question was not contrary to 
the interest of the employer because the employer in this case condoned 
the corrupt activity. However, we question the assumption inherent in 
that argument that the corrupt management of the union should be 
equated with the union entity itself for the purposes of determining what 
was "contrary to its interest." Simply because Parise Sr. and some other 
corrupt union leaders knew that some port agents were bribed does not 
mean that the practice could not have been against the interest of the 
port agents' employer, the union. The union has an existence separate 
from its leadership -- its mission is to represent and assist union 
members. 
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members. One union official described the role of the union 
in the following terms: 
 
       [T]he NMU has a very proud history. And I think we're 
       important to our members. Certainly we represent 
       them before the companies. We are responsible for 
       their collective bargaining agreement overall, but we 
       also represent them on a day to day basis. If a seaman 
       has a problem aboard a ship, he will come to the hall 
       and talk to a union official. 
 
J.A. at 1308. Other testimony supported this description of 
the union as concerned with the work-related welfare of 
union members. We can easily take judicial notice of the 
fact that the union movement exists of, by, and for workers 
and dedicates itself to their welfare and the recognition of 
their rights. Seeking redress for work-related injury through 
proper legal representation easily fits within this sphere of 
the union's interest and affairs. In addition to the fact that 
making attorney referrals was consistent with the purposes 
of the union, there was significant evidence presented from 
which the jury could have determined that the union 
concerned itself with its members' legal representation and 
that making attorney referrals was part of the union's 
affairs. 
 
The testimony demonstrated that the job of port agent 
involved a wide range of tasks encompassing as many 
different aspects as there are facets of the union members' 
work-related needs. J.A. at 1309. One agent explained that 
in addition to taking care of finances he enforced ship 
rules, took care of grievances and supervised the operation 
of the union hall. J.A. at 594. Another stated that as the 
business agent of the port he would "[t]ake care of all the 
union business, ship people out, take care of my members." 
J.A. at 637. While in some types of work, helping others 
mights be viewed as incidental to a job function, we view 
the union - port agent - member relationship depicted here 
to provide a unique setting in which assistance of this 
nature was integral to, not incidental to, the union's 
business of caring for its members. In describing her job as 
a Pension and Welfare Plan Representative, Rywelski said 
that she assisted union members and stated of this 
population, "the average seaman is not well educated and 
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they need -- a lot of them can barely read and they need 
help preparing these forms. A lot of them, they don't 
understand them and they just need assistance." J.A. at 
521-22. 
 
Thus, the union through its port agents and other 
employees, served as counselors and helpers of this 
itinerant, seafaring population. Consistent with this role, 
making attorney referrals was a service routinely provided 
to the seamen coming into port by port agents and other 
union employees. Union members testified that they relied 
on port agents for attorney referrals after suffering an on- 
the-job injury. J.A. at 507; 1201. It was well-known among 
union members that port agents provided such referrals. 
Significantly, there was no evidence presented that union 
members, officials, or employees believed that making 
attorney referrals was inappropriate or beyond the scope of 
the port agents' employment or the union's sphere of 
interest. The evidence is clear that these employees 
provided attorney referrals to injured members and that 
this practice was consistent with the mission of the NMU. 
This practice furthered the union's express goal of assisting 
sick or needy members. 
 
Further, not all union employees received payoffs for 
making these referrals. Gerasimos, a union official, testified 
that assisting members with legal representation was"an 
unofficial duty" of port agents and that as a port agent he 
had provided such referrals without receiving any 
payments. J.A. at 737-38. Another official, a Vice President 
of the NMU, testified that she had never taken any money 
for making attorney referrals. J.A. at 1311.12 
 
Additionally, in determining that providing attorney 
referrals was conduct "in relation to the affairs" of the 
union, we cannot ignore the NMU's involvement in the 
business of legal services and referrals. Parise Sr. circulated 
a letter in which he named individual lawyers as the official 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. This Vice President testified that while she knew port agents made 
referrals to personal injury lawyers, she was unaware that some received 
payments or fees in exchange for making these referrals. J.A. at 1310. 
This contradicts the dissent's view that "the entire Union leadership 
knew of cash payments." Dissent at 28. 
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"union attorneys" for particular geographic regions. Sacks 
was named as the official attorney for the East Coast and 
was given office space in the union hall in New Orleans. In 
addition, members of the NMU Enterprise, including Parise 
Sr. and Jr., established the Legal Services Plan for the 
purpose of providing routine legal services to union 
members -- hoping that participating attorneys would 
eventually be retained for lucrative personal injury cases. 
Thus, in the present case, Parise Sr. and others in the NMU 
Enterprise went out of their way to make the legal concerns 
of union members part of the NMU's "affairs."13 
 
We believe that the facts of this case clearly bring the 
agents' conduct within the ambit of their jobs for the union 
and that the referrals of seamen to counsel was part and 
parcel of the affairs of the union. Union employees were 
able to be bribed by virtue of their employment with the 
union; that is, they held positions in which they were 
expected to counsel and advise union members. The 
injuries for which members required legal representation 
were sustained on-the-job. That attorney referrals were 
given for employment-related injuries further strengthens 
the relationship between the role of the union and these 
services. This practice is easily within the explicit mission 
of the NMU. Having examined the language of the statute 
and the facts of this case, we conclude that providing 
attorney referrals constituted conduct in relation to the 
affairs of the union. 
 
While not specifically challenged by the appellant, we also 
note that the other requisite under the commercial bribery 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. We recognize that the involvement of the NMU in the "legal affairs" of 
the union members was undertaken by Parise Sr. -- at least in part -- 
for his own financial gain. Thus, Parise Sr.'s efforts in this regard are 
not 
dispositive of the fact that attorney referrals and legal services were 
part 
of the union's affairs. However, this involvement must be viewed in the 
context of the evidence that providing attorney referrals was a common 
practice of the port agents. In addition, there was no testimony offered 
that any union members or officials questioned the use of union space 
for this purpose or establishment of the LSP to aid the seamen in their 
legal affairs. Providing these services was considered to be a legitimate 
activity of the union which furthered its mission of helping needy 
members. 
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statute, that is, that the employee be influenced to act in a 
particular way in relation to the employer's affairs is also 
shown by the evidence. The payments in this case clearly 
influenced the conduct of the port agents. These agents 
testified that their referrals were not based on a 
determination that Sacks was the best lawyer to represent 
injured union members. J.A. at 599; 640. Rywelski stated 
that she knew nothing about Sacks's skills as a lawyer or 
the fees he charged. J.A. at 528. In fact, when asked 
whether he was chosen to be the "NMU attorney" because 
he was a good lawyer, Sacks himself replied, "No, I got 
picked because I could pay off the agents. I had the money 
to do it." J.A. at 255. Both Pegan and Rywelski testified 
that they understood that they were receiving money to 
make referrals to Sacks -- they received a benefit to 
influence their conduct in relation to the union's affairs. 
 
The dissent urges that our view of the relationship of 
lawyer referrals to the unions' affairs is misguided and 
attempts to analogize this situation to a hospital's lack of 
interest in a doctor's referral of a patient.14 We are also 
chastised for going beyond the classic example of conflict of 
interest depicted in Bellis. It is our ruling, however, that the 
evidence at trial provided ample support for the jury's 
finding that, given the unique relationship among the union, 
its members, and the port agents, the commercial 
Pennsylvania bribery statute had been violated. 
 
The evidence and the case law support the conclusion 
that the union employees' conduct in these matters 
constituted the acceptance of money to affect conduct in 
relation to the affairs of the employer. Given the union's 
mission, the nature of the port agents' work, and the 
subject matter and nature of the referrals, the jury could 
reasonably find, as it did, that the agents' conduct violated 
Pennsylvania's commercial bribery statute and that Parise 
Jr., as solicitor, was guilty of this underlying offense for the 
purposes of the RICO conviction. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. In order for this analogy to be apposite, the hospital would have to 
be made up of, and exist solely by reason of, the patients as its 
members, and the doctor's sole responsibility, as charged by the 
hospital, would be to further the hospital's mission and assist the 
members/patients and provide for their needs. This is not the case. 
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C. Exclusion of evidence 
 
Finally, Parise Jr. contends that the district court 
improperly excluded relevant testimony of a government 
witness on cross examination as to the non-criminal intent 
of the recipient of the alleged commercial bribe. The district 
court's exclusion of evidence is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. See Abrams v. Lightolier Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 
1213 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
Pennsylvania's commercial bribery statute requires the 
establishment of an agreement or understanding between 
both parties that the benefit offered will influence conduct 
in relation to the affairs of the employer. 18 Pa. C.S. 
S 4108(c). Parise Jr. argues that the district court erred in 
excluding testimony which related to whether Rywelski 
thought she was "doing something wrong" or"committing a 
crime" when she took money from Parise Jr. The district 
court excluded the evidence because her state of mind 
regarding the criminal nature of the conduct was irrelevant. 
We agree. Parise Jr. confuses the need to show that there 
was an "agreement or understanding" with evidence of the 
intent or state-of-mind of the parties. The statute does not 
require that the parties knew that their agreement was 
wrong or illegal. The government did elicit relevant 
testimony from both Pegan and Rywelski that they 
understood that the payments they received from Parise Jr. 
were for referrals to lawyers. Thus, the district court did not 
exclude evidence which related to Rywelski's belief about 
whether an agreement or understanding had been formed. 
It excluded only that which was irrelevant -- evidence as to 
whether Rywelski had a criminal state of mind. Therefore, 
the district court's exclusion of that portion of Rywelski's 
testimony was not an abuse of discretion. 
 
III. 
 
Having considered all of the issues raised by Parise Jr. in 
this appeal, we find them to be without merit. Therefore, 
the judgment of the district court and its order denying the 
defendant's post-trial motion will be affirmed. 
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GARTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
Louis Parise, Jr. has been convicted and sentenced to 
serve thirty months in federal prison for racketeering. The 
jury convicted Parise of engaging in a pattern of 
racketeering acts by making cash payments to union 
officials John Pegan and Deborah Rywelski in exchange for 
referring injured union members to an attorney associated 
with Parise. The difficult question raised in this appeal is 
whether Parise's conduct qualifies as a "racketeering 
activity," which turns on whether his conduct constituted a 
violation of Pennsylvania's commercial bribery statute, 18 
Pa. C.S.A. S 4108. See 18 U.S.C. S 1962(c); Brokerage 
Concepts, Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 140 F.3d 494, 521 
(3d Cir. 1998). If Parise's conduct did not violateS 4108, 
then his RICO conviction cannot stand. 
 
The government's theory is that Parise's referral 
payments violated S 4108 because Pegan and Rywelski 
acted "in relation to the affairs" of the union when they 
referred union members to Parise and Bernard Sacks, Esq. 
in exchange for payments from Parise. The majority has 
agreed with this theory, and has affirmed Parise's 
conviction and sentence. 
 
I disagree with the majority's conclusion that Parise's 
conduct violated S 4108. I believe that the majority's broad 
interpretation of the "in relation to the affairs" language of 
S 4108 represents an unwarranted expansion of its scope 
contrary to its "carefully circumscribed" meaning, 
Brokerage Concepts, 140 F.3d at 528, and that the record 
reveals no evidence that Parise violated S 4108 when the 
statute is properly construed. Accordingly, I respectfully 
dissent. 
 
I. 
 
Pennsylvania is one of twenty states that criminalizes 
commercial bribery for influencing an agent's conduct "in 
relation to the affairs" of the agent's principal.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. States that presently criminalize commercial bribery for influencing an 
agent's conduct "in relation to the affairs" of the agent's principal 
include 
 
                                23 
  
Pennsylvania's commercial bribery statute is representative 
of these statutes. Its text reads: 
 
       (a) Corrupt employee, agent or fiduciary .--An 
       employee, agent or fiduciary commits a misdemeanor 
       of the second degree when, without the consent of his 
       employer or principal, he solicits, accepts, or agrees to 
       accept any benefit from another person upon 
       agreement or understanding that such benefit will 
       influence his conduct in relation to the affairs of his 
       employer or principal. 
 
       .... 
 
       (c) Solicitation.-- A person commits a m isdemeanor of 
       the second degree if he confers, or offers or agrees to 
       confer, any benefit the acceptance of which would be 
       criminal under [subsection (a)] of this section. 
 
18 Pa. C.S.A. S 4108. Courts interpreting the "in relation to 
the affairs" language in the century since commercial 
bribery statutes were first enacted have held universally 
that the core of the offense is the breach of an agent's duty 
of loyalty. See, e.g., Note, Bribery in Commercial 
Relationships, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1248, 1249 n.10 (1932) 
("The breach of fiduciary duty has been considered the 
foundation of the offense [of commercial bribery.]"). 
Pennsylvania is no exception: in Commonwealth v. Bellis, 
399 A.2d 397 (Pa. 1979), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Alabama, see Ala. Code S 13A-11-120 (1975); Arizona, see Ariz. Rev. 
Stat. S 13-2605; Connecticut, see Conn. Gen. Stat. S 53a-160; Illinois, 
see 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/29A-1; Louisiana, see La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
S 14:73; Michigan, see Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. S 750.125; Minnesota, 
see Minn. Stat. Ann. S 609.86; Mississippi, see Miss. Code Ann. 
S 97-9-10 (1972); Nevada, see Nev. Rev. Stat. S 207.295; New Hampshire, 
see N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. S 638:7; New York, see N.Y. Penal Law S 180.00 
(McKinney); North Dakota, see N.D. Cent. Code, S 12.1-12-08; 
Oklahoma, see Okla. Stat. tit. 21, S 380; Pennsylvania, see 18 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. S 4108; Rhode Island, see R.I. Gen. Laws S 11-7-4 (1956); 
South Carolina, see S.C. Code Ann. S 16-17-540 (Law. Co-op. 1976); 
South Dakota, see S.D. Codified Laws S 22-43-1; Texas, see Tex. Penal 
Code S 32.43; Utah, see Utah Code Ann.S 76-6-508 (1953); Wisconsin, 
see Wis. Stat. Ann. S 134.05. 
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stated that "the purpose of [Pennsylvania's commercial 
bribery statute] is to require an agent, employe[e,] or 
servant to possess an undivided duty of loyalty to his 
principal." Id. at 400 (internal quotations omitted). This is 
consistent with the Pennsylvania legislature's Official 
Comment associated with S 4108, which states that the 
statute's purpose is to criminalize bribery in "relationships 
where a duty of fidelity is owed." This duty of loyalty is 
breached only when an employee acts contrary to the 
interest of his employer. 
 
The precise scope of conduct criminalized by the "in 
relation to the affairs" language in state commercial bribery 
statutes identical to Pennsylvania's has been the subject of 
a substantial body of case law. These cases have 
established a consistent and certain meaning for the text 
we must interpret.2 According to these cases, the duty of 
loyalty protected by the statute is not violated unless the 
agent (here, Pegan or Rywelski) accepts a payment in 
exchange for conduct that puts the interests of the payor 
(here, Parise and Sacks) above the contrary interests of the 
principal (here, NMU, the union). See, e.g., D.E. Ytreberg, 
Annotation, Validity and Construction of Statutes Punishing 
Commercial Bribery, 1 A.L.R.3d 1350, 1361 (1965) (noting 
that in the cases interpreting the "in relation to the affairs" 
language, actions that did "not affect the employer's 
interest in any way" were not criminal); 11 C.J.S. Bribery 
S 3 (1995) (noting that commercial bribery statutes "require 
the offer of a bribe to an employee with the intent that he 
promote the interests of the person offering the bribe over 
those of his employer"). 
 
Accordingly, it is not commercial bribery to induce an 
agent to accept payment for conduct that does not 
adversely affect the interests of the agent's principal. See 
People v. Jacobs, 130 N.E.2d 636, 637 (N.Y. 1955) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Although most of the cases have arisen outside of Pennsylvania, the 
fact that they have established a certain meaning for the text in question 
makes these cases a natural source of interpretive authority. See 
Simmler v. City of Philadelphia, 198 A. 1, 3 (Pa. 1938) (looking to the 
interpretations of the same language in statutes by other state courts in 
order to interpret a vague Pennsylvania statute). 
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(overturning conviction of photographer who paid bursar for 
list of names of ocean liner passengers, because there was 
no evidence that release of the names of the passengers 
was contrary to the interests of the ocean liner company). 
Further, it is not commercial bribery to induce an agent to 
accept payment in an attempt to influence conduct over 
which the agent has no control. See State v. Nadeau, 105 
A.2d 194 (R.I. 1954) (overturning commercial bribery 
conviction of councilman for planning to accept payment to 
attempt to influence selection of city police chief, because 
councilman had no control over selection process). 
 
An illustrative example of these principles is People v. 
Graf, 24 N.Y.S.2d 683 (App. Div. 1941). In Graf, a New York 
appellate court reversed the conviction of a union official 
who had accepted expense payments from management. 
Management had wanted to expand the territorial scope of 
its sign making business beyond New York, and sought to 
have Graf travel to union headquarters outside of New York 
to encourage the union members outside of New York to 
allow the sign company to accept work there. When the 
union refused to pay Graf's travel expenses, management 
made a secret arrangement with Graf to do so. Graf was 
subsequently indicted and convicted of commercial bribery. 
The basis of the charge was that Graf had accepted 
payments from management that had induced him to act 
"in relation to the affairs" of his union. 
 
On appeal, Graf argued that his conduct was not "in 
relation to the affairs" of the union. The Appellate Division 
agreed, noting inter alia that Graf had done nothing that 
could be construed as putting the interests of the sign 
company over those of his union. Even though Graf had 
secretly accepted payments to do union-related activity, 
"the action taken by [Graf] was favorable to the union." Id. 
at 687. This was insufficient to constitute commercial 
bribery, the court held, because the statute "requires proof 
of payment of money to influence an agent in a way 
inconsistent with his duties towards his employer." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
 
As these cases indicate and our court recently 
recognized, the scope of Pennsylvania's commercial bribery 
statute is "carefully circumscribed." Brokerage Concepts, 
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140 F.3d at 528. Of course, this does not mean that it is 
impossible for payments made in exchange for an agent's 
referral to a third party to constitute commercial bribery. 
See, e.g., Hastings v. Fidelity Mortgage Decisions Corp., 984 
F. Supp. 600, 606-07 (N.D.Ill. 1997) (Civil RICO) (denying 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Illinois 
commercial bribery statute for referral payment scheme, 
but noting that plaintiffs had survived 12(b)(6) dismissal 
only "barely," and noting that "[i]f this set of facts were 
presented to us at the summary judgment stage, we would 
be inclined to grant judgment for the defendants"); cf. 
Brokerage Concepts, Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., No. 
95-1698, 1995 WL 455969 (E.D.Pa. July 27, 1995) (Civil 
RICO) (denying motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
of corruption of a disinterested person under 18 Pa. St. 
Ann. S 4108(b) in a referral scheme involving health care 
company). However, it does mean that making payments in 
exchange for agents' referrals constitutes commercial 
bribery only when the agent has put the interests of the 
payor above the contrary interests of the agent's principal. 
See Jackson v. Radcliffe, 795 F. Supp. 197, 206 (S.D.Tex. 
1992) (Civil RICO) (holding that hospital that referred 
clients to a radiologist in exchange for 30% of the 
radiologist's fees did not violate commercial bribery statute 
by breaching duty of loyalty to patients). 
 
II. 
 
An application of these legal principles to Parise's 
payments to Pegan and Rywelski leads ineluctably to the 
conclusion that these payments did not constitute 
commercial bribery. The record simply fails to support the 
view that Pegan and Rywelski acted in any way contrary to 
the interests of the union when they referred injured union 
members to Parise and Sacks. There is no evidence that 
Pegan and Rywelski put Parise's and Sack's interests over 
the union's because the union was completely disinterested 
in which lawyer an injured seaman retained for a personal 
lawsuit. 
 
Under the statute, an employee may not take a bribe if it 
will "influence his conduct in relation to the affairs of his 
employer or principal." 18 Pa. C.S.A. S 4108(a) (emphasis 
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added). Although an individual seaman obviously has an 
interest in which lawyer represents him, an individual 
seaman is not the employer or principal of the port agents; 
the union as a collective whole is the port agent's employer 
or principal. Thus, whether or not a seaman knew that the 
port agents were receiving referral fees, the port agents did 
not, under this Pennsylvania statute, owe an individual 
seaman a duty of loyalty. 
 
I begin with the union's position on its port agents 
accepting referral payments. The record reveals that the 
entire union leadership knew of the cash payments, and 
even encouraged them. Referral payments were considered 
rewards for loyal port agents, whose official duties focused 
on the much more mundane tasks of accounting and 
producing weekly financial reports for higher union 
officials. App. 743. As the Government concedes in its brief, 
"the [union] historically allowed its officials (usually port 
agents) to refer injured members to designated maritime 
lawyers in exchange for cash payoffs. Indeed, Parise, Sr. 
admitted that as union president he sometimes fielded 
member requests for legal referrals, and that he expressly 
allowed port agents to refer members to personal injury 
attorneys." Appellee's Br. at 8 (emphasis added and 
citations omitted). In other words, the payments were part 
of the union's standard procedure, endorsed by the union 
president himself. 
 
In light of the union's express allowance (if not 
encouragement) of referral payments, it is unclear how port 
agents could have been acting contrary to the union's 
interests in receiving them. See Jacobs, 130 N.E.2d at 637 
(holding that an employee could not be guilty of violating 
commercial bribery statute because employer knew of 
payment and declined to stop it; employer's allowance 
reflected fact that payment could not have been contrary to 
employer's interest). 
 
Further, although the union had no interest in union 
members' selection of a personal injury lawyer, the 
testimony of Pegan and Rywelski reveal that they were not 
acting contrary to the best interests of the union when they 
referred seamen to Parise Jr. and Sacks.3  John Pegan, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Pegan and Rywelski testified under immunity agreements, as did 
Sacks. 
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port agent for Boston, first became acquainted with Sacks 
when Pegan became unsatisfied with the lawyer he had 
hired three years earlier to represent him in a personal 
injury action. App. 663. Acting on the advice of Louis 
Parise, Sr., Pegan consulted with Sacks, who advised Pegan 
that "it wouldn't be feasible" to switch lawyers at that time 
"because of all the investigation work" that Pegan's lawyer 
had already performed. App. 665. Pegan believed that 
Sacks was a good lawyer: Pegan testified that he "had 
heard" that Sacks "got good results in the injury cases." 
App. 667. Thus, when the union members in Boston were 
"not satisfied with [Boston maritime lawyers] . . . [and] 
want[ed] somebody else," App. 667, Pegan would refer the 
members to Parise, Jr. and Sacks. 
 
Similarly, there is no evidence that Deborah Rywelski, 
who acted as the port agent in Charleston, South Carolina, 
was acting contrary to the union's interest when she made 
attorney referrals. When a member would come to her and 
ask her for a lawyer, she testified, she would give the 
member Parise, Jr.'s card. Rywelski would then explain 
that Parise, Jr. was an investigator for Sacks, and that 
Parise, Jr.'s father was the head of the union. App. 530. 
She would tell the union member, "Call him up. If you like 
what they've got to say, fine. [I]f you don't, I know some 
other attorneys I can send you to." Id. (emphasis added). As 
in State v. Nadeau, supra, the port agents had no control 
over which lawyer an individual seaman would eventually 
choose; they could not themselves commit the union 
members to Sacks's representation. 
 
The union's express allowance of the payments, 
combined with the testimony of Rywelski and Pegan, 
reveals that there is no evidence that Pegan and Rywelski 
placed the interests of Sacks and Parise, Jr. ahead of the 
interest of the union in accepting payments from Parise, Jr. 
Pegan thought that Sacks was a good lawyer, and even 
sought Sacks's representation for himself. Rywelski was 
very careful to explain that Sacks was only one of several 
attorneys to whom she could refer the member, and 
directed the member to accept Sacks's representation only 
if the member "liked what [Parise, Jr. and Sacks had] to 
say." The union leadership not only knew of the referral 
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payments, but encouraged and even directed them. Given 
these facts, there is simply no evidence that the union had 
an interest in which lawyer a member retained and no 
evidence that Rywelski or Pegan acted against the interests 
of the union in referring injured union members to Parise, 
Jr. and Sacks. Accordingly, Parise, Jr.'s payments to 
Rywelski and Pegan for making the referrals could not 
constitute commercial bribery. 
 
III. 
 
The majority's understanding of S 4108 is dramatically 
different from the one I have presented. As I see it, the 
majority's approach has five significant flaws. 
 
1. Failure to follow the accepted interpretation of 
   commercial bribery. 
 
In the absence of definitive authority in Pennsylvania,4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The few cases in Pennsylvania that interpretS 4108 do not address 
the issue at hand. United States v. Johns, 742 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Pa. 
1990), aff'd, 972 F.2d 1333 (3d Cir. 1991) (table), is inapplicable 
because 
it involved the quintessential example of commercial bribery. In Johns, 
an employee, responsible for purchasing supplies and services for his 
employer, chose vendors for his employer in exchange for kickbacks from 
the vendors. The employer certainly had an interest in which vendors 
provided the employer goods and services. In this case, the port agents 
gave seamen (who were not the port agents' employers or principals) 
advice on who to choose as a personal injury lawyer. The port agents 
themselves had no control over who the seamen would choose as a 
lawyer, and the port agents' employer, the union, had no control or 
interest over the seamen's choice of a lawyer. 
 
Likewise, Pennsylvania v. Bellis, 484 Pa. 486, 399 A.2d 397 (1979), 
involved a city councilman's representation of third parties in their 
contractual dealings with the city and its agencies. The contracts at 
issue in Bellis were between the third party entities who paid the 
councilman a fee and the councilman's employer, the city. Thus, the 
councilman was taking money to help third parties gain advantages with 
his employer. In this case, the port agents did not receive referral fees 
from Sacks so that Sacks could represent the port agents' employer, the 
union, in its affairs. Rather, individual union members chose Sacks to be 
their personal lawyers to assist them in pursuing their personal, not 
union, claims. 
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the majority's refusal to acknowledge a century of law from 
other jurisdictions interpreting the same or similar 
commercial bribery statutes is perplexing. As I have 
previously pointed out, some twenty states have 
commercial bribery statutes that contain S 4108's exact 
phrase. See note 1, supra. Most of the relevant cases 
(especially Graf, Jacobs, Nadeau, and Radcliffe) advance an 
interpretation of the commercial bribery statute that is very 
different from that offered in the majority's opinion, and 
that would lead to a contrary result. The majority opinion 
seeks to distinguish only Nadeau, see  Maj. Op. at 16 n.10, 
and declines to discuss the other statutes I have cited and 
the other cases. Id. Hence, it neither reconciles those cases 
with its approach, nor explains why they were wrongly 
decided, if in fact it believes they were. 
 
2. Failure to identify any breach of loyalty owed to the 
   union as the employer of the port agents. 
 
My second objection is the majority's focus on union 
members, who are not the port agents' employers, as 
distinct from the union itself, which is the port agents' 
employer. It should be remembered that the commercial 
bribery statute requires and Bellis emphasizes that an 
agent must possess an undivided loyalty to his principal, 
that is, his employer. The record reveals that none of the 
actions taken by the port agents in any way affected 
adversely or were disloyal to the union. Indeed, one would 
be hard pressed to argue that the port agent's referral 
activities were adverse to the union members, but of 
course, that is irrelevant. As I have stated repeatedly, the 
port agent must have been disloyal to the union to meet the 
statutory standard and be held criminally liable. 
 
One can search far and wide in the majority opinion and 
in the record but still cannot ascertain disloyalty or adverse 
actions taken by Pegan and Rywelski with respect to the 
affairs of the union. Hence, the holding of Bellis, as distinct 
from the standard applied in Bellis, is inapposite to Parise's 
appeal. Bellis, which is cited by the majority at 14-15, is a 
classic example of conflict of interest, falling within the 
purview of S 4108's reach. In Bellis, a city councilman 
accepted payment from third parties to negotiate on their 
behalf with the councilman's employer or principal. This 
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action adversely affected the City of Philadelphia's interest 
and affairs. It would have been impossible for Bellis to 
negotiate on behalf of his third party clients and against the 
City of Philadelphia without breaching his duty of loyalty to 
the City. 
 
But Parise is not Bellis because Parise's payments to 
Pegan and Rywelski did not involve the union, and it is the 
union which is the employer of the two port agents. An 
example furnished to me by one of my colleagues highlights 
this distinction. He posited: 
 
       Suppose an individual visits a hospital to receive an 
       inoculation required for foreign travel. After receiving 
       his shot, the patient asks the doctor if she knows 
       where the patient could get his vision checked before 
       departing. If the doctor refers the patient to an 
       optometrist from whom she had received payments in 
       exchange for referrals, is the doctor guilty of 
       commercial bribery (and, by extension, a RICO 
       violation)? Even assuming that making referrals is part 
       of the hospital's affairs, the doctor has not committed 
       commercial bribery because she has not acted contrary 
       to the interest of her employer, the hospital. 
 
Even if the referral is contrary to the patient's interest (as 
a referral to an allegedly poor attorney may be contrary to 
a union member's interest), the overarching principle upon 
which Bellis is predicated requires an agent's "undivided 
loyalty to his employer." Thus, extending the bribery statute 
to cover payments for "employment-related activity" leaves 
it without limit and far exceeds the text of the statute and 
the import of Bellis. 
 
3. Invading the function of the legislature. 
 
My third objection is that the majority's interpretive 
approach seems to me inconsistent with a proper judicial 
role. As the Supreme Court stated in United States v. Bass, 
404 U.S. 336, 92 S. Ct. 515 (1971), "legislatures and not 
courts should define criminal activity." Id. at 348, 92 S. Ct. 
at 523. Courts must be careful not to expand the reach of 
criminal statutes by judicial fiat because citizens should 
not be sent to "languish[ ] in prison unless the [legislature] 
has said they should." Id. (quoting Henry Friendly, Mr. 
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Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, in 
Benchmarks, 196, 207 (1967)); see also Yates v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 298, 310, 77 S. Ct. 1064, 1072 (1957) 
(Harlan, J.) (absent legislative guidance, criminal statutes 
are to be strictly construed). 
 
The majority recognizes these principles, see Maj. Op. at 
12-13, but has not honored them. It has chosen simply to 
reject the long-established meaning of the "in relation to the 
affairs" language, and has substituted its own, much 
broader interpretation. As the majority acknowledges, a few 
months ago our Chief Judge stated in a civil RICO case that 
commercial bribery in Pennsylvania is "a carefully 
circumscribed crime," Brokerage Concepts, 140 F.3d. at 528 
(Becker, C.J.), and refused to expand the reach ofS 4108 to 
include conduct that would not otherwise be criminal 
under the statute. The majority turns the Brokerage 
Concepts holding on its head--the case stands for the 
proposition that the reach of the criminal bribery statute 
should not be expanded, yet the majority cites the case for 
the proposition that the criminal bribery statute should not 
be limited in accordance with established principles of 
criminal statutory interpretation. The Brokerage Concepts 
case requires that the courts not expand S 4108 beyond its 
current parameters; I submit that a broadening of the 
scope of conduct criminalized by S 4108 is best left to the 
Pennsylvania legislature. 
 
4. Majority's misapplication of its broad reading of 
   S 4108 to this case. 
 
My fourth objection relates to the majority's application of 
its newly fashioned standard to the facts of this case. The 
majority reasons that port agents regularly referred injured 
union members to lawyers, such that paying port agents for 
those referrals influenced their work-related conduct. Maj. 
Op. at 19-21. However, the record is clear that the port 
agents almost always received payments in exchange for 
their attorney referrals. According to Sacks' testimony, 
payments were the standard practice in the union: the 
question was not whether the port agents would be paid for 
their referrals, but who would pay. App. 160-66. Even the 
Government's brief concedes this, stating that the union 
"historically allowed its officials (usually port agents) to 
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refer injured members to designated maritime lawyers in 
exchange for cash payoffs." Appellee's Br. at 8. 
 
Absent evidence that port agents regularly referred 
injured union members to lawyers when they were not 
being paid off to do so, and more importantly, absent any 
record evidence of adverse effects on the union, 5 I do not 
understand how the majority can conclude that making 
attorney referrals was part of the union's affairs. Surely, if 
it was part of the union "affairs" to refer seamen to lawyers, 
then there would be substantial evidence of port agents 
referring union members to lawyers when no payments 
were involved. The record only supports the view that port 
agents regularly engaged in activities of no concern to their 
employer and beyond the scope of their employment (which 
was focused on accounting and financial reporting). They 
simply took advantage of their acquaintances with the 
injured seamen and enhanced their income by making 
attorney referrals. 
 
5. Overextended reading of the port agents' scope of 
   employment. 
 
My fifth and final objection has to do with the actual and 
not the hypothetical functions of the port agent. The record 
discloses that their established duties embraced primarily 
accounting and financial reporting. App. 743.6 Any referrals 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The majority refers to Mr. Gerasimos as having provided legal referrals 
without receiving any payments. Maj. Op. at 19. Gerasimos, however, 
characterized this function as an unofficial duty, not an official duty, 
of 
a port agent. App. 737. The other reference by the majority to a vice- 
president who did not take money for attorney referrals obviously was 
not a port agent. 
 
6. The union's constitution and by-laws specifically describe the duties 
of 
a port agent. Kenneth Gerasimos, a union vice-president and former port 
agent of NMU, agreed that the constitution and by-laws accurately 
reflected the duties of a port agent, which provides: 
 
       Branch [port] agent shall be responsible for implementing the 
       directives of the division chairman and council in the port or 
ports 
       of their jurisdiction. They shall be prepared to account 
financially or 
       otherwise for the activities of their port or ports whenever 
demanded 
       by the division chairman. In any event, they shall prepare and 
       forward to the district treasurer a weekly financial report showing 
in 
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made, whether to doctors, lawyers, therapists, accountants, 
barbers, or the like, were undertakings beyond the scope of 
their employment. The fact that they were paid for these 
activities could be of no moment to the union, their 
employer, and indeed could not be deemed evidence of 
disloyalty to the union. On the other hand, had the port 
agents falsified their financial reporting and accounting or 
disclosed to a third party confidential union information in 
return for a payment by a third party, that falsification or 
disclosure would have been evidence of disloyalty to the 
union and would have constituted commercial bribery 
because it affected the affairs of the union, their employer. 
 
The port agents could not have been fired or sanctioned, 
and indeed they were not, for taking monies for referrals, 
but common sense dictates that had they affected their 
employer's interest by falsifying or in any way not truthfully 
performing their accounting and financial reporting 
functions in exchange for third party monies, their jobs 
would be at risk, to say nothing of criminal liability being 
visited upon them. 
 
IV. 
 
Given Louis Parise, Jr.'s intimate involvement in his 
father's schemes over a period of years, he may have 
violated several criminal statutes. However, the United 
States prosecuted Parise, Jr. on a RICO charge based only 
on a tenuous reading of a rarely used state criminal 
statute. In the course of affirming Parise, Jr.'s conviction, 
the majority has extended the statute just enough to 
include his conduct within its grasp. A fair and consistent 
interpretation of the statute, however, reveals that Parise, 
Jr. has been convicted and sentenced to serve thirty 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       detail weekly income and expenses and complying with all other 
       accounting directions issued by the district treasurer. 
 
The majority relies upon the preamble of the NMU constitution, rather 
than this provision specific to port agents, to define the scope of the 
port 
agents' employment. The preamble describes the union's purpose with 
respect to its members, while the provision above cited describes the 
port agents' duties with respect to the union. 
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months in prison for conduct that did not constitute the 
crime of commercial bribery. 
 
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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